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Abstract
Various papers have presented folk-theorem results that yield efficiency in the repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. I present a mild refinement that
requires robustness against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents, and
I show that only defection satisfies this refinement among all the existing equilibria in the
literature.
JEL Classification: C73, D82. Keywords: Belief-free equilibrium, evolutionary sta-
bility, imperfect private monitoring, repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, communication.
1 Introduction
The theory of repeated games provides a formal framework to explore the possibility of coop-
eration in long-term relationships, such as collusion between firms. The various folk theorem
results (e.g., Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986) have established that efficiency can be achieved under
fairly general conditions. The classical literature assumes that players perfectly observe the past
actions. Several papers in the 90-s (e.g., Abreu et al., 1990) have extended these results to the
case of imperfect but commonly shared information about the past action profiles.
In many real life situations players privately observe imperfect signals about the past actions.
For example, each firm in a cartel privately observes its own sales, which contain imperfect
information about secret prices cuts that its competitors offer to some of the customers. Formal
analysis of imperfect private monitoring began with the pioneering work of Sekiguchi (1997).
Since then, several papers have presented various folk theorem results that have shown that
∗Email: yuval.heller@economics.ox.ac.uk. I would like to express our deep gratitude to Mehmet Ekmekci, Peter
Eso, and Erik Mohlin, for many useful comments.
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efficiency can be achieved also with imperfect private monitoring (see Kandori, 2002; Mailath &
Samuelson, 2006 for surveys of this literature).
The current paper presents the equilibrium refinement of weak stability, which requires ro-
bustness against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents, and shows that
only defection satisfies this mild refinement in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma among all the
equilibria in the existing literature on imperfect monitoring.1
Weak Stability One of the leading justifications for using a Nash equilibrium to predict be-
havior is its interpretation as a stable convention in a population of potential players. Suppose
that individuals in a large population are repeatedly drawn to play a game, and that initially all
individuals play the strategy s∗ but occasionally a small group of agents may experiment with a a
different strategy s′. If this induces the experimenting agents to gain more than the incumbents,
than the population would move away from s∗ towards s′. Thus, strategy s∗ is evolutionarily
stable (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973) if (1) it is a best-reply to itself (i.e., it is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium),2 and (2) it achieves a strictly higher payoff against any other best-reply strategy s′:
u (s∗, s′) > u (s′, s′). One example for an evolutionarily stable strategy in the repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma is the strategy of always defecting regardless of the history.
Evolutionarily stability is arguably a too-strong refinement as demonstrated in the Rock-
Scissors-Paper game (see Section 2.2) that admits a unique Nash equilibrium, which is not evolu-
tionarily stable, but it is a plausible prediction for the long run average behavior in the population
(see, e.g., Benaïm et al., 2009). Motivated by this, I say that a symmetric Nash equilibrium s∗
is weakly stable if it achieves a weakly higher payoff against any evolutionarily stable strategy s′
that is a best-reply against s∗.3 The definition implies that any symmetric game admits a weakly
stable strategy, and that if s∗ is not weakly stable, then it is not a plausible prediction to the
long run behavior. This is because as soon as a small group of agents experiments with playing
s′, the population diverges away towards s′, and it will remain in s′ in the long run (due to s′
being evolutionarily stable). A typical example for a non-weakly stable equilibrium is the mixed
equilibrium in a coordination game, for which every small perturbation takes the population to
one of the pure equilibria.
1Except the equilibria that rely on sufficient correlation between the private signals of different players (Mailath
& Morris, 2002, 2006; Kandori, 2011), and the equilibria that rely on communication between the players at each
round of the game (Compte 1998; Kandori & Matsushima 1998; Obara 2009), as discussed in Section 1.1.
2To simplify the analysis we focus in most of the paper only on symmetric equilibria, and we extend the analysis
to asymmetric equilibria in Section 5.1.
3The formal definition (see Section 2.2) also allows a two-step movement towards the evolutionarily stable
strategy s′ (first from s∗ to some strategy s˜, and then from s˜ to s′). To simplify the exposition, we ignore this
slight complication in the introduction. Note, that all the equilibria in the existing literature are destabilized by
a single step; the two-step part of the formal definition is only required against hypothetical belief-free equilibria.
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Summary of Results The most commonly used equilibrium in the literature on imperfect
private monitoring is the belief-free equilibrium in which the continuation strategy of each player
is a best reply to his opponent’s strategy at every private history. These equilibria are called
“belief-free” because a player’s belief about his opponent’s history is not needed for computing a
best-reply. Piccione (2002) and Ely & Välimäki (2002) have presented folk-theorem results for the
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma using belief-free equilibria. In particular, they show that any payoff
between zero and one is a symmetric belief-free equilibrium payoff if the monitoring technology
is almost perfect and the players are sufficiently patient.
The main result of this paper shows that under the mild refinement of weak stability, the
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma admits a unique belief-free equilibrium in which everyone defects.
The intuition is that in belief-free equilibria players are always indifferent between the two actions,
but this implies that always defecting is a best-reply, and as soon as a small group of agents starts
defecting, the entire population diverges away towards defection.
Next I extend the above main result to the set of belief-free review-strategy equilibria (Mat-
sushima, 2004; Hörner & Olszewski, 2006; Yamamoto, 2007, 2012) in which (1) the game is
divided to a sequence of review phases in which each player plays a constant action, and (ii) at
the beginning of each review phase, a player’s continuation strategy is a best reply regardless of
the history.
Bhaskar & Obara (2002) have presented a folk-theorem result for the repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma that does not rely on belief-free equilibria. These “belief-based” equilibria divide the
repeated game into several subgames, such that each player is indifferent in the beginning of each
subgame between defecting in the entire subgame and playing a more cooperative strategy. My
last result shows that none of these equilibria are weakly stable. The intuition is based on the
observation that always defecting is a best-reply to these equilibria, and that it implies that a
small perturbation would diverge the entire population towards defection.
1.1 Related Literature and Contribution
Belief-Free equilibria Ely et al. (2005), Miyagawa et al. (2008), and Yamamoto (2009, 2013)
have extended the folk-theorem results that rely on belief-free equilibria to general repeated
games and to costly observability. Kandori & Obara (2006) study a setup of imperfect public
monitoring and show that belief-free private strategies can improve the efficiency relative to the
maximal efficiency obtained by public strategies. Takahashi (2010, Section 3.2) adapts the notion
of belief-free equilibria to obtain a folk-theorem result to a setup in which the players are randomly
matched with a new opponent at each round. My main result shows that none of the equilibria
3
in these papers satisfies weak stability in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Conditionally-Correlated Signals A few papers in the literature yield stable cooperation if
the private signals are sufficiently correlated conditional on the action-profile. Mailath & Morris
(2002, 2006) show that when the private signals are almost perfectly correlated conditional on
the action-profile (i.e., almost public monitoring), then any sequential equilibrium of the nearby
public monitoring game with bounded memory remains an equilibrium also with almost public
monitoring. Some of these equilibria are evolutionarily stable, and in particular, cooperation can
be the outcome of an evolutionarily stable strategy.
Kandori (2011) presents the notion of weakly belief-based equilibria, in which the strategy
of each player is a best-reply for any private history of the opponent up to the actions of the
previous round. Unlike standard belief-based equilibria, players need to form the correct beliefs
about the signal obtained by the opponent in the last round. Kandori (2011) demonstrates
that sufficient correlation between the private signals (conditional on the action-profile) allow to
achieve a strict weakly belief-based equilibrium that yields substantial cooperation. The strictness
of the equilibrium implies that it satisfies the refinement of evolutionary stability.
The current paper shows that all the mechanisms in the existing literature can only yield
defection as the outcome of a weakly-stable equilibrium in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
with conditionally-independent imperfect monitoring. I leave for future research the question
whether any new mechanism may yield cooperation as a stable outcome with conditionally-
independent private monitoring. One promising direction to solve this question might rely on
the methods developed in Heller & Mohlin (2015) for the related setup of random matching
and partial observation of the partner’s past behavior. In that setup, Heller & Mohlin (2015)
characterize conditions under which only defection is stable, and construct novel mechanisms to
sustain stable equilibria whenever these conditions are not satisfied.
Robustness Sugaya & Takahashi (2013) show that “generically” only belief-free equilibria are
robust to small perturbations in the monitoring structure. Our main result shows that belief-free
equilibria (except defection) are not robust to small perturbations in the behavior of the potential
opponents. Taken together, the two results suggest that defection is the unique equilibrium
outcome of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma that is robust to both kinds of perturbations.
Communication Compte (1998), Kandori & Matsushima (1998), and Obara (2009) have pre-
sented folk-theorem results that rely on (noiseless) communication between the players at each
stage of the repeated game. The players use this communication to publicly report (possibly with
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some delay) the private signals they obtained. These equilibria are constructed such that the
players have strict incentives while playing, but they are indifferent between reporting the truth
and lying (regardless of the reporting strategy of the opponent). One can show that this property
implies that these equilibria are neutrally stable (and thus also weakly stable).
The current paper has important implications to antitrust laws. If one agrees that weak sta-
bility is necessary for a collusive equilibrium to be plausible, then it implies that communication
between the players is critical to obtain collusive behavior whenever the private imperfect mon-
itoring between the firms is such that the conditional correlation between the private signals is
sufficiently low.
Structure The model is described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the main result (instability
of belief-free equilibria). Sections 4 shows the instability of the other equilibria in the literature.
Section 5 extends the analysis to asymmetric equilibria and to monitoring without full-support.
2 Model
2.1 Repeated Prisoner Dilemma with Imperfect Monitoring
I analyze a symmetric two-player δ−discounted repeated interaction with imperfect private mon-
itoring. Table 1 presents the matrix payoff of the stage game: a Prisoner’s Dilemma game that
depends on two positive parameters g and l. When both players play action C (cooperate) they
both get a high payoff (normalized to one), and when they both play D (defect) they get a low
payoff (normalized to zero). When a player defects and the opponent cooperates, the defector
gets 1 + g, while the opponent gets −l. The players share a common discount factor 0 ≤ δ <1.
Table 1: Matrix Payoff of a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (g, l > 0 )
C D
C 1
1 −l 1+g
D 1+g
−l
0
0
Let i ∈ {1, 2} be an index denoting one of the players, and let −i denote the other player.
We use ∆ (W ) to represent the set of probability distributions over a finite set W. Let Σi be a
finite set of signals (or messages) for each player. For each possible action profile a ∈ {C,D}2,
the monitoring distribution m (·|a) specifies a symmetric joint probability distribution over the
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finite set of signal profiles Σ := Σ1 × Σ2. When action profile a is played and signal profile σ is
realized, each player i privately observes his corresponding signal σi.
Let mi (·|a) denote the marginal distribution over the signals of player i. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that the monitoring structure has full support, i.e., that each signal profile
is observed with positive probability after each action profile. Formally:
Assumption 1. The monitoring structure has full support: m (σ|a) > 0 for each action profile
a ∈ {C,D}2 and each signal σ ∈ Σ.
One example for a monitoring structure with full support is the conditionally-independent
−perfect monitoring in which each player privately observes his opponent’s last action with
probability 1 −  and observes the opposite action with the remaining probability . In Section
5.2 we show that our results are essentially the same also without Assumption 1.
A t-length (private) history for player i is a sequence that includes the action played by
the player and the observed signal in each of the previous t rounds of the game. Let H ti :=
({C,D} ×Σi)t denote the set of all such histories for player i. Each player’s initial history is the
null history, denoted φ. A pair of t-length histories (called simply a history) is denoted ht. Let
H t denote the set of all t-length histories, H = ∪tH t the set of all histories, and Hi = ∪tH ti the
set of all private histories for i.
A repeated-game (behavior) strategy for player i is a mapping s : Hi → ∆ (Ai). Let sD be
the strategy that always defect (sD (·) = D).
For history hti , let s|hti denote the continuation strategy derived from s following history
hti. Specifically, if hihˆi denotes the concatenation of the two histories hi and hˆi, then s|hti is
the strategy defined by s|hti
(
hˆi
)
= s
(
hihˆi
)
. Given a strategy s′, let B (s′) denote the set of
strategies that are best replies to s′, and for each t and ht−i ∈ H t−i let B
(
s′|ht−i
)
denote the set
of continuation strategies for i that are best replies to s′|ht−i .
Definition 1 (Ely et al. 2005). A strategy profile (s, s′) is belief-free if for every ht, s|hti ∈
B
(
s′|ht−i
)
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The condition characterizing belief-free strategy profile is stronger than that characterizing
sequential equilibrium. In a sequential equilibrium, a player’s continuation strategy is the player’s
best reply given his belief about his opponent’s continuation strategy, that is, given a unique
probability distribution over the opponent’s private histories. In a belief-free strategy profile, a
player’s continuation strategy is his best reply to his opponent’s continuation strategy at every
private history. In other words, a sequential equilibrium is a belief-free strategy profile if it has
the property that a player’s continuation strategy is still the player’s best reply when he secretly
learns about his opponent’s private history.
6
We will therefore speak directly of belief-free equilibria. We say that a strategy s is a symmetric
Nash (belief-free) equilibrium if the profile (s, s) is a Nash (belief-free) equilibrium. One example
for a symmetric belief-free equilibrium is the strategy sD.
2.2 Evolutionary Stability
I present a refinement of a symmetric Nash equilibrium that requires robustness to a small group of
agents who experiment with a different behavior (see, Weibull, 1995 for an introductory textbook).
Suppose that individuals in a large population are repeatedly drawn to play a symmetric
two-person game, and that there is an underlying dynamic process of social learning in which
more successful strategies (which induce higher average payoffs) become more frequent. Suppose
that initially all individuals play the equilibrium strategy s∗. Now consider a small group of
agents (called, mutants) who play a different strategy s′. If s′ is not a best reply to s∗, then if
the mutants are sufficiently rare they would be outperformed. If s′ is a best reply to s∗, then
the relative success of the incumbents and the mutants depends only on the average payoff they
achieve when being matched against a mutant opponent. If the incumbents achieve a higher
payoff when being matched against mutants, then the mutants are outperformed. Otherwise, the
mutants outperform the incumbents, and their strategy gradually takes over the population.
The formal definition is as follows. Let U (s, s′) denote the expected discounted payoff to a
player following strategy s and facing an opponent who plays strategy s′ .
Definition 2 (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Maynard-Smith, 1982). A symmetric Nash equi-
librium s∗ is neutrally (evolutionarily) stable if U (s∗, s′) ≥ U (s′, s′) (U (s∗, s′) > U (s′, s′)) for
each strategy s∗ 6= s′ ∈ B (s∗).
Note that any strict symmetric equilibrium, such as the strategy sd (always defecting), is
evolutionarily stable.
Neutral stability is arguably a “too strong” refinement because: (1) some games do not admit
any neutrally stable strategies, and (2) some equilibria that are not neutrally stable are plausible
predictions of the time-average behavior in the game. This is demonstrated in the Rock-paper-
scissors game in Table 2 (left side). The unique symmetric equilibrium is
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
, which is not
neutrally stable (because R ∈ B
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
and U
((
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
, R
)
= −0.5 < U (R,R) = 0. One
can show that although
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
is not neutrally stable, then under mild assumptions on the
dynamics, the time average of the aggregate play converges to
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
(Benaïm et al., 2009).
This motivates me to present a weaker stability refinement that focuses only on vulnerability
to mutant strategies that are evolutionarily stable. Strategy s∗ is vulnerable to strategy s′ if
strategy s′ can take over a population that initially plays s∗. Formally:
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Table 2: Auxiliary Games to Demonstrate Notions of Stability
R P S
R 0
0 −2 1 1 −2
P 1
−2
0
0 −2 1
S −2 1 1 −2 0 0
Rock-Paper-Scissors.
a b
a 1
1
0
0
b 0
0
1
1
Coordination Game
Definition 3. Strategy s∗ is vulnerable to strategy s′ if s′ ∈ B (s∗) and U (s′, s′) > U (s∗, s′) .
A symmetric Nash equilibrium is weakly stable if (1) it is not vulnerable to any evolutionarily
stable strategy, and (2) it is not “two-step” vulnerable to an evolutionarily stable strategy, i.e., it
is not vulnerable to any strategy that is vulnerable to an evolutionarily stable strategy. Formally:
Definition 4. A symmetric Nash equilibrium s∗ is weakly stable if:
1. There does not exist s′ such that s∗ is vulnerable to s′, and s′ is evolutionarily stable; and
2. There do not exist s˜, s′ such that s∗ is vulnerable to s˜, strategy s˜ is vulnerable to s′, and
strategy s′ is evolutionarily stable
Observe that the definition of weak stability satisfies the following appealing properties:
1. Any neutrally stable strategy is weakly stable.
2. Any game admits a weakly stable strategy.
3. If s∗ is not weakly stable, then it is not a plausible prediction to the long run behavior in
the population. Even if the population initially plays s∗, then as soon as a small group
of agents experiments with playing s′, the population diverges away towards s˜. If this is
followed by another small group of agents who play s′, then the population will converge to
s′, and will remain there in the long run.
3 Instability of Belief-Free Equilibria
Piccione (2002) and Ely & Välimäki (2002) present folk-theorem results for the repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma using belief-free equilibria. In particular, they show that any payoff between zero and
one is a symmetric belief-free equilibrium payoff if the monitoring technology is almost perfect
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and the players are sufficiently patient. Out main result shows that under the mild refinement
of weak stability, the game admits a unique symmetric belief-free equilibrium in which everyone
defects. In section 5.1 we show how to extend this result to asymmetric equilibria.
The sketch of the proof is as follows. As observed by Ely et al. (2005, Section 2.1), the set of
optimal actions at each round in a belief-free equilibrium is independent of the private history.
This implies that the belief-free equilibrium is vulnerable to a deterministic strategy that always
defect except in rounds in which cooperation is the unique optimal action. This deterministic
strategy is vulnerable to the evolutionarily stable strategy in which everyone defects.
Proposition 1. Strategy sd is the unique weakly stable belief-free symmetric equilibrium of the
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Proof. Let s∗ be a symmetric belief-free equilibrium. A continuation strategy zi is a belief-free
sequential best-reply to s∗ beginning from period t if
zi|ht˜i∈Bi(s∗|ht˜−i)∀t˜≥t and ht˜ ∈ H t˜;
the set of belief-free sequential best-replies beginning from period t is denoted by Bti(s). Let
Ati =
{
a ∈ {C,D} |∃zi ∈ Bti(s), ∃hti such that zi
(
hti
)
(ai) > 0
}
;
denote the set of actions in the support of some belief-free sequential best-reply beginning from
period t. As noted by Ely et al. (2005, Section 2.1) ∃hti can be replaced with ∀hti, because if
zi is a belief-free sequential best-reply to s−i and every continuation strategy zi|hti gets replaced
with the strategy zi|h˜ti for a given h˜ti, then so obtained strategy zi is also a belief-free sequential
best-reply to s−i. Note that the symmetry of the profile (s∗, s∗) implies that At := Ati = Atj.
We complete the proof by dealing with two (exclusive and exhaustive) cases:
1. There exists time t such that: (I) both actions are best replies (At = {C,D}), and (II) there
is an history after which one of the players cooperate with positive probability, i.e., ∃hti s.t.
s∗i (hti) (C) > 0. Let s˜ be the deterministic strategy that plays D at all periods except in
those in which C is the unique best-reply to s∗:
s˜
(
hti
)
=

C Ati = {C}
D otherwise
.
The definition of s˜ implies that s˜ is a best reply to s∗. The fact that s˜ induces a deterministic
play that is independent of the observed signals implies that defection is the unique best-
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reply against s˜ at all rounds (and after any history), i.e., {sD} = Bti (s˜). Observe that
strategy s˜ defects with a strictly higher probability than s∗. This implies that s˜ yields a
strictly larger payoff against itself relative to s∗ U (s∗, s˜) < U (s˜, s˜). Moreover, if s˜ 6= sD,
then strategy sD is a best reply against s˜ and U (s˜, sD) < U (sD, sD). As sd is evolutionarily
stable, it implies that s∗ is not weakly stable.
2. In any time t in which both actions are best replies, each player defects after each history,
i.e., s∗i (hti) (D) = 1 ∀hti s.t At = {C,D}. Observe that in this case s∗ induces a deterministic
play that is independent of the observed signals. This implies that defection is the unique
best-reply against s∗ at all rounds (and after any history), i.e., {sD} = Bti (s∗), and we get
a contradiction unless s∗ = sD.
Remark 1. Note that in all the belief-free equilibria presented in the existing literature the set
of belief-free sequential best-replies always includes the action D (i.e., D ∈ Ati for each t), which
implies that all these equilibria are directly vulnerable to sd (i.e., s˜ = sd in the above proof) and
the two-step vulnerability is required only against hypothetical belief-free equilibria in which at
some rounds cooperation is the unique best-reply.
4 Instability of Other Equilibria
The previous section shows that the main kind of equilibrium used in the literature on private
imperfect monitoring (the belief-based equilibrium) does not satisfy weak stability. In this section
we extend this result to the other kinds of equilibria in the literature: belief-free review-strategy
equilibria, and belief-based equilibria.
4.1 Instability of Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibria.
Matsushima (2004); Hörner & Olszewski (2006); Yamamoto (2007, 2012) have used the notion of
belief-free review-strategy equilibrium in which (1) the infinite horizon is regarded as a sequence of
review phases such that each player chooses a constant action throughout a review phase, and (ii)
at the beginning of each review phase, a player’s continuation strategy is a best reply regardless
of the history. Simple adaptation to the proof of Proposition 1 show that defection is the unique
weakly-stable symmetric belief-free review-strategy equilibrium.
The adaptation of the proof is done as follows. Let s∗ be a symmetric belief-free review-strategy
equilibrium. Let (tl)∞l=1 be the increasing sequence of starting times for the review phases. Let
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Ali ⊆ {C,D} denote the set of actions in the support of some continuation sequential best-reply
that begins from period tl and plays the same action throughout the l-th review phase. Let s˜
be the deterministic strategy that always defects except in review phases in which Ali = {C}.
An analogous argument to the proof of Proposition 1 shows that s∗ is vulnerable to s˜ (and s˜ is
vulnerable to sd).
4.2 Instability of Belief-Based Equilibria
Bhaskar & Obara (2002) (extending Sekiguchi, 1997) present a folk-theorem result for the repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma that does not rely on belief-free equilibria. Instead, the best-reply of each
player depends on his belief about the private history of the opponent (“belief-based equilibria”).
In what follows, I show that these equilibria are not weakly stable.
Bhaskar & Obara (2002) consider a symmetric signaling structure with two signals Σi = {c, d},
where c (resp., d) is more likely when the opponent plays C (resp. D). Given any action profile,
there is a probability of  > 0 that exactly one player receives a wrong signal and a probability
of ξ > 0 that both players receive wrong signals. Bhaskar & Obara present for each 0 < x < 1 a
symmetric sequential equilibrium sx that yields a symmetric payoff of at least x whenever  and
ξ are sufficiently small. This construction is the key element in their folk-theorem result. In what
follows we sketch this equilibrium sx, and then show that it is not weakly stable.
Let sT be the trigger strategy: cooperating as long as all observed signals are c-s, and defect
in the remaining game if signal d is ever observed. The strategy sx divides the entire game into
disjoint subgames (say, to n subgames, where subgame k includes the rounds that are equal to
k modulo n), and the play in each subgame is independent of the other subgames. Each player
mixes at the first round of each subgame: he plays sT (trigger strategy) with probability pi and
plays sD (always defecting) with the remaining probability. Bhaskar & Obara show that there
exists a division into subgames and a mixing probability pi such that: (1) the expected discounted
symmetric payoff of the game is at least x, (2) strategy sx is a sequential equilibrium.4
Claim 1. The symmetric sequential equilibrium sx is not weakly stable.
Sketch of proof. The fact that sx mixes between sD and sT at the beginning of each subgame,
implies that sD is a best reply against sx. Recall, that sD is evolutionarily stable and the unique
best reply to itself. These observations immediately imply that sx is not weakly stable.
4As observed by Bhaskar (2000) and Bhaskar et al. (2008), these belief-based equilibria can be purified a` la
Harsanyi in a simple way (while this is not the case for belief-free equilibria). Nevertheless, we show they still do
not satisfy weak stability.
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5 Extensions
To simplify the presentation of our results we focused only on symmetric equilibria (for which the
definition of evolutionary stability is simpler), and that the monitoring has full support. In this
section we show that both assumption can be relaxed.
5.1 Instability of Asymmetric Equilibria
In this section we show how to extend our model to deal with asymmetric monitoring structures
and asymmetric equilibria.
Adaptations to the model We relax the assumption that the monitoring structure is sym-
metric. That is, the alphabet of each player may be different (i.e. Σ1 6= Σ2), and the distribution
of signals m (·|a) is not necessarily symmetric. Following Selten (1980), we consider a single pop-
ulation of agents that are randomly matched into pairs to play the repeated Prisoner Dilemma
(possibly with asymmetric monitoring structure), and the agents in each pair are randomly as-
signed into the two roles: player 1, and player 2.
A complete-strategy of an agent σ = (s1, s2) is a pair describing his strategy in each of the
two roles (i.e., for each i ∈ {1, 2} si : Hi → ∆ (Ai) is the strategy he plays when he is player i).
Any equilibrium of the underlying game (s1, s2) corresponds to a symmetric equilibrium in the
population in which all agents play the complete-strategy σs1,s2 := (s1, s2). Finally, we say that
the Nash equilibrium (s1, s2) is weakly stable if the complete-strategy σs1,s2 is weakly stable.
Adaptations to the proofs Proposition 1 also holds for asymmetric equilibria. Let (s∗1, s∗2)
be a belief-free equilibrium, and let σs∗1,s∗2 be the corresponding complete strategy. The proof
should be adapted as follows. The sets of best-reply actions at each round, Ati and Atj, remain
the same (though, they are not necessarily equal sets in this case). The strategy s˜1 (s˜2) is
defined with respect to At2 (At1) in an analogous way to the definition of s˜ in the original proof.
The definition implies that the complete strategy σ˜ = (s˜1, s˜2) is a best reply to σs∗1,s∗2 , that
U
(
σs∗1,s∗2 , σ˜
)
< U (σ˜, σ˜), and that σd = (sd, sd) is the unique best reply against σ˜, which implies
that σs∗1,s∗2 is not weakly stable (unless it coincides with σd) using the same arguments as in the
original proof.
Claim 1 can be adapted in a similar manner to show that also all the asymmetric sequential
equilibria in Bhaskar & Obara (2002) and Chen (2010) are not weakly stable.
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5.2 Instability without Full-Support Monitoring
In this section we show how to extend our model and results to deal with monitoring structures
without full support.
We slightly refine Definition 4 of weak stability by allowing the strategy s′ to be neutrally
stable, rather than evolutionary stable (because if the monitoring structure does not have full
support, then no strategy is evolutionarily stable, and, in particular, the strategy sD is only
neutrally stable). Claim 1 holds with this new definition with minor adaptations to the proof
that are implied by the adapted definition of weak stability.
Proposition 1 should be slightly weakened in this setup, to state that any weakly stable belief-
free equilibrium is realization equivalent to sD (i.e., the players always defect on the equilibrium
path). Case 1 of the proof is adapted by assuming that there an history of length t that is reached
with positive probability in which the players cooperate with positive probability. Similarly, case
2 is adapted to assume that in any time in which both actions are best replies, the players defect
after each history that is reached with positive probability. All the other arguments in the proof
remain essentially the same.
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